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Introduction 
Two concerns animate much recent literature on the subject of trust 
online -- in research journals, trade magazines, news and government 
reports. One is a concern over building adequate security systems, 
the other, is a concern over e-commerce. Technical experts in security 
warn that the vast networked information system (the network of 
networks that includes local private systems in addition to public 
systems like the Internet, the Web, Cyberspace ) is vulnerable to 
technical failure as well as malicious attack. To induce users to trust 
the system we must build strong mechanisms of security to create 
«trusted», or rather, trustworthy systems that overcome both types of 
vulnerabilities. Proponents of e-commerce, spurred by an interest in 
sustaining active commerce online, advocate in favor of technology 
and practices that would induce consumers to trust providers of goods 
and services, would induce providers to trust consumers, and in 
general, would create a general climate of trust online. Consumers 
must not be fearful that they will be cheated, defrauded, have their 
credit card numbers stolen, or receive poor quality goods; providers 
must not be fearful that people will fail to pay, or repudiate their 
commitments. Each must not fear that those with whom they transact 
will, somehow, reach out and harm them or their property. 
Although the two concerns differ in that one is primarily focussed on 
the technology and the other, primarily motivated by a particular use, 
they have in common a vision of the likely shape of the solution; 
namely, a suite of tight technical security mechanisms. So 
conspicuous has been the vision of trust through security portrayed by 
these two groups that it now occupies the mainstream – in part 
because there are no equally persistent, competing interpretations 
and in part, because talk of trust online is relatively new and the 
mainstream view relatively uncontested. This essay is an evaluation of 
the vision of trust through security. Drawing on important insights on 
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trust in general of philosophers, social scientists and social theorists, I 
argue that the online landscape this vision would produce would not 
be conducive to trustworthiness or trust. It fails because it is founded 
upon on a conceptual misconstrual of trust. Although this critical 
evaluation is not followed by a full-blown alternative, it demonstrates 
how theoretical insights can, and should, inform practical efforts to 
induce, promote and nurture trust online. 
When speaking about trust in the online world, we could be referring, 
in the broadest sense, to a technological system so vast and powerful 
that it sits now at the hub of almost all other parts of the critical 
infrastructures mediating significant aspects of social, community, 
cultural and political life and controlling and in some cases conjoining 
fundamental infrastructures, including energy, commerce, finance, 
transportation, education, and communication. Here, I focus attention 
on the conditions of trust not in the context of the system as a whole 
and in the vast and powerful grid that connects and controls satellites, 
nuclear devices, energy, the stock exchange, and so forth. I am 
concerned with trust in context of those parts of the system that are 
directly experienced by the ordinary people, who in increasing 
numbers, use it to talk, conduct business transactions, work, seek 
information, play games, and transact with public and private 
institutions. Presently this means the World Wide Web (the Web) and 
the various servers (computers), conjoined networks, people, and 
institutions that comprise it. 
Neither does this essay cover everything that trust online could mean. 
Trust is an extraordinarily rich concept covering a variety of 
relationships, conjoining a variety of objects. One can trust (or distrust) 
persons, institutions, governments, information, testimony, deities, 
physical things, systems, and more. Here, I will be concerned with trust 
as a relationship between one person (a trustor) and another (the 
trustee). Although, in practice, the trustee position could be filled by 
almost anything, here I limit consideration to cases where the trustee 
is a being to which we are willing to ascribe intentions, motivations, 
interests, or reasons, and might also refer to as «agents». Central to 
this category, I would place people – individually and in groups. But I 
would also be willing to include organizations, communities, and 
institutions. Excluded from my discussion, therefore, will be at least 
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one quite common reference to trust in the online context, namely, trust 
in the networked, digital information systems themselves, in the 
layered hardware and software that comprise the micro-systems 
individually and the macro-system that is formed by these. My reasons 
are pragmatic. These cases are sufficiently different from on another 
that they deserve separate (but equal) treatment. 
The Function of Trust 
It is not unfair to question why we care about trust online. Such a 
question provokes two lines of response. One is to elaborate on the 
function and value of trust, generally. We care about trust online 
because trust brings about valued ends, generally, and consequently 
is good for the online world as well. This section addresses the 
function and value of trust. The second reason for caring about trust 
online – the subject of the next section – is that the online context 
deserves special attention. Because the world online is distinctive in 
ways that are relevant to trust, we should examine these differences 
and their implications for trust. 
There is an unexamined sense that trust is a good. Meaningful 
relationships rest on trust; families, communities, societies, and 
political institutions work better in a climate of trust. Scholarship 
endorses this sense of trust’s function and importance. It reveals the 
benefits of trust not only for individuals – those who trust as well as 
those who are trusted, but also for relationships between and among 
people, and for groups structured as institutions, communities, 
societies, and so on. I draw on a few brief samples from the extensive 
literature on trust to illustrate the various functions trust is ascribed. 
Niklas Luhman, a social theorist whose profound work on trust has 
been widely influential, characterizes trust as a mechanism that 
reduces complexity and enables people to cope with the high levels of 
uncertainty and complexity of contemporary life. Trust makes the 
uncertainly and complexity tolerable because it enables us to focus on 
a few possible alternatives. Humans, if faced with a full range of 
alternatives, if forced to acknowledge and calculate all possible 
outcomes of all possible decision nodes, would freeze in uncertainty 
and indecision. In this state, we might never be able to act in 
situations that call for action and decisiveness. In trusting, Luhmann 
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says, «one engages in an action as though there were only certain 
possibilities in the future.» (20) Trust, further, enables, «...co-operative 
action and individual but coordinated action: trust, by the reduction of 
complexity, discloses possibilities for action which would have 
remained improbable and unattractive without trust-- which would not, 
in other words, have been pursued.» (25) According to this account, 
trust expands people’s capacity to successfully relate to a world 
whose complexity, in reality, is far greater than anything we are 
capable of taking in. 
Trust’s rewards extend beyond the individual. Enhancing 
relationships, trust also facilitates opportunities for discovery and 
creativity. 
The possibilities for action increase proportionately to the increase in 
trust --trust in one’s own self-presentation and in other people’s 
interpretation of it. When such trust has been established, new ways of 
behaving become possible; jokes, unconventional initiatives, 
bluntness, verbal short cuts, well-timed silences, the choice of delicate 
subjects etc. When trust is tested and proven in this way, it can be 
accumulated by way of capital. (40) 
This idea of trust as capital -- social capital, has been echoed, 
developed, and popularized by Robert Putnam in his study now 
classic study of Italian civic society. (Putnam, 169-170) With each trust 
affirming action, trust accrues within communities as capital, there to 
tap in troubled times. Other political philosophers have explored ways 
in which trust benefits societies and the associations within them. 
Philip Pettit, for example, stresses the strength and solidarity that trust 
can engender: «…it is now common wisdom that trust is a precious if 
fragile commodity in social and political life.» (225); it is characteristic 
of flourishing civil societies (Pettit, Putnam). Trust among citizens may 
be the magic ingredient that helps undergird political and civil stability 
in multicultural societies (Weinstock); trust is an "important lubricant of 
the social system» (Arrow quoted in Seligman, 75); it is the basis for 
modern solidarity (Seligman). Trust by individuals of institutionalized 
authority, such as government, may prevent a citizenry’s 
disengagement from the system, and may even prevent highly volatile 
and disruptive reaction to harms perceived to come from these 
authorities (Becker). 
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Emerging from these and other works is the idea that trust is 
especially needed in complex, varied, and somewhat unpredictable, 
personal, social and political contexts. Trust facilitates cooperation 
and success within civil and political society; it enriches people’s lives 
by encouraging activity, boldness, and adventure and by enriching the 
scope of individuals’ relationships with others. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that an interest in trust should grow just as the realm we 
known as Cyberspace, the Internet, the Web, the Global Information 
Infrastructure, burgeons, just as it crosses a threshold of complexity 
where individual participants are faced with a multiplicity of possible 
interactions, relationships, community, offerings and experiences; just 
as it is beset by deep and difficult questions about authority and 
governance. 
Trust promises the same benefits online as off: namely trust improving 
people’s experiences and relationship, improving communal and civic 
life, and stabilizing governance. We can expect that more people and 
institutions will «buy in» to the online world, will engage with others 
online, if there is sufficient trust. If a climate of trust can be established 
on the Net, and attitudes of trust toward partners in electronically 
mediated transactions, then the online world will thrive, it will attract 
information, it will be lively with interaction, transaction and 
association. This thriving will attract further investment of all kinds, 
which in turn will fuel participation, and so on. Conversely, if people do 
not trust interactions mediated electronically, they will minimize them; 
they will be cautious and suspicious in their dealings, they will not 
place information and creative works on the web, they will not engage 
in E-commerce, they will not indulge in MUDS, MOOS, E-lists, B-
boards, Listservs, chatrooms, buddy lists, electronic banking, and 
more. A great resource will be wasted. 
The Conditions of Trust Online and Off 
Given all that seems to be at stake in promoting trust and 
trustworthiness online, what, if anything, stands in the way of simply 
extending the conceptual insights and practical wisdom of research 
and scholarship into the online arena? Although, ultimately, this is a 
promising strategy, there is considerable ground to clear. Concern 
over trust online is prompted not only by an appreciation of the value 
and function of trust, in general, but by the impression that the online 
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landscape poses particular challenges to forming and sustaining trust. 
The online world is a new phenomenon and novelty, or unfamiliarity, in 
itself can stall the formation of trust. Beyond sheer novelty, however, 
there are more intractable differences between online and offline 
contexts that are particularly relevant to the formation of trust. Before 
identifying the obstacles in the way of trust online, let us review 
common wisdom and scholarship on the subject of the formation of 
trust in general. 
Questions may prompt our inquiry: What mechanisms govern trust? 
To what factors are people’s tendencies to trust systematically 
responsive? What influences people’s judgments that other people, 
groups, and institutions are worthy of trust?. A common set, which we 
may think of as cues, clues, or evidence of trustworthiness, seem 
crucial to whether people decide to trust, or form trusting attitudes. 
Inducing, or eliciting trust, these cues may also nurture or sustain it. 
These clues may induce or elicit trust as well as nurture and sustain it. 
The ones I have chosen to discuss below reflect my specific concern 
with trust in the online world. 
History and Reputation 
One of the most convincing forms of evidence that others merit trust is 
their past behavior. If they behaved well in the past, protected our 
interests, did not cheat or betray us and, in general, acted in a 
trustworthy manner, they are likely to elicit trust in the future. If they 
have not fulfilled past hopes, then we will tend not to trust them. Where 
we have not built a history of direct interaction with others, we may 
learn indirectly about their trustworthiness from the experiences of 
others, or be influenced in our judgments even more remotely through 
their reputations. 
Inferences Based on Personal Characteristics 
A trusting attitude may be based on the presence of perceived 
qualities of the other. Philip Pettit identifies four: virtue, loyalty, 
prudence and a desire for the good opinion of others. That is to say, 
these qualities influence whether a person will trust their subjects. 
Pettit writes, 
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To be loyal or virtuous or even prudent is, in an obvious sense of the 
term, is to be trustworthy. It is to be reliable under trust and to be 
reliable, in particular, because of possessing a desirable trait. (211) 
The fourth quality, namely, a desire for the good opinion of others, 
though less deserving of our admiration, is nevertheless a powerful 
mechanism for preventing betrayals of trust (203). Accordingly, Pettit 
recommends against calling the person who chases good reputation 
trustworthy, preferring a more modest commendation of trust-
responsiveness, or trust-reliance. Though not in direct disagreement 
with Pettit, Adam Seligman offers a different perspective, drawing 
attention to the importance of familiarity, similarity and shared values 
as triggers of trust. What we know about someone, what we may infer 
on the basis of «their clothing, behavior, general demeanor,» (69) 
may lead us to judgments about their values and moral commitments, 
especially telling if we judge them to be similar to ours. A common 
religious background, a high school, a neighborhood, a traumatic 
experience (e.g. fought in a war), affects how confident we are in 
predicting what others will do, how comfortable we are to rely on them. 
Relationships: Mutuality and Reciprocity 
Aside from personal qualities, the relationship in which one stands to 
another might bear on the formation of trust. The presence of common 
ends can stimulate trust. Such cases of mutual ends occur when a 
person is «in the same boat» with another. When I fly in an airplane, 
for example, I place trust in the pilot partly because he is in the plane 
with me. I presume that we have common, or confluent ends; our fates 
are entwined for these few hours in which we fly together. 
Reciprocity is slightly different but it, too, can be grounds for trust. In a 
reciprocal relationship, we trust others not because we have common 
ends but because each of us holds the fate of others in our hands in a 
manner of tit-for-tat. This may occur, for example, when people are 
taking turns. The agents whose turn is first, deals fairly, or reliably, or 
responsibly with the other because soon the tables will be turned. The 
relationship of reciprocity admits of great variability. In some cases, 
there is clear and imminent reversal of roles (today I drive your kids, 
tomorrow, you drive mine), in others it is more generalized. Thus, I 
might donate money to the Cancer Foundation hoping that when I am 
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ill, these funds will somehow help me. Robert Putnam highlights the 
role of reciprocity in communities which are blessed with a climate of 
trust. Citizens help those in need with the expectation that when they 
are need, others will help them. (Putnam, 171-176) 
Role Fulfillment 
There is another, perhaps more compelling reason for trusting the 
pilot of my airplane. After all, the pilot would not trust me despite our 
common interest in of staying alive. Crucial to my trusting the pilot is 
that he is a pilot and all that being a pilot within the framework of a 
familiar system means. I know what pilots are supposed to do. I am 
aware of the rigorous training they undergo, the stringent requirements 
for accreditation and the status of airlines within a larger social, 
political and legal system. Several of the authors already mentioned 
have discussed the importance of roles to the formation of trust. (See 
Baier, Pettit and Seligman) 
Contextual Factors 
Beyond what we know about the other, which may or may not be 
decisive in eliciting trust, features of the context in which we operate 
can affect our readiness to trust. A setting in which betrayal and fidelity 
are routinely publicized, for example, would be more conducive to 
trust-reliance, and consequently trust, than a setting in which people 
can effectively hide their deeds – especially misdeeds. A setting in 
which rewards and sanctions follow trustworthiness and betrayals 
respectively will induce trustworthiness and trust. Where sanctions and 
rewards are not possible, a community can provide other modes of 
approbation and disapprobation for trustworthy and untrustworthy 
behavior respectively through such means as publicly articulated 
norms, character education, parables, and so on. (Luhman, 84) And if 
all else fails, a society might set in place forms of «trust insurance» to 
act as a safety net for those whose trust is betrayed. 
Obstacles to Trust Online 
The online world differs from the offline world in ways that are relevant 
to trust. In particular, it obscures or lacks entirely the dimensions of 
character and personality, nature of relationship, and institutional 
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character on which we normally rely to form attitudes or base 
decisions about trust. Consider three prominent cases: 1) identity; 2) 
personal features; 3) role definition. 
1) Missing Identity 
In its current design, the medium offers individuals numerous ways to 
cloak, or obscure identity. Agents are not compelled to relinquish the 
identities of their off-line selves in many of their online transactions. 
Although anonymity offers enormous benefits, it reduces the range of 
cues upon which people base judgments of trust. Referring to the 
principles mentioned above, we can see why identity is important to 
trust: identity is the string upon which we thread the history of 
interactions with another. Without this thread we lack the traditional 
means of referring to past experiences either of vindicated trust or of 
betrayal. Lacking information about a sustained identity means we are 
also deprived the means of learning from the experiences of others 
whether an agent is trust reliant. Lacking knowledge of an agent’s 
sustained identity means, also, that the usual means of reasoning 
based on a reciprocal arrangement cannot be developed. Finally, 
because identity is also bound up with accountability, people might 
presume that anonymous agents are less likely to act responsibly. As 
a result they would be less inclined to trust. And where identity is 
lacking, our usual means of enforcing accountability cannot be 
expected to work. 
2) Missing Personal Characteristics. 
There is an opacity not only with respect to others’ identities, but with 
respect to many of their personal characteristics which affect 
(heighten or diminish) attitudes of trust. We are separated from others 
in time and space; we lack cues that may give evidence of similarity, 
familiarity, or shared value systems. We may not know the other’s 
gender (male, female, or «other»), age, race, socioeconomic status, 
occupation, mode of dress, geographic origins, nor some of the 
bodily signals that serve as cues in interactions where others are 
physically proximate. Are we communicating with a 14 year-old girl or 
a 57 year-old man posing as a 14 year-old girl? Are we selling a 
priceless painting to an adolescent boy or to a reputable art dealer? 
Are we sharing a virtual room with an intriguing avatar or a virtual 
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rapist? (Dibbell) We must transact and depend on others who are 
separated not only by distance but also by time, who are disembodied 
in many of the ways that typically contribute to our sense of their 
trustworthiness. 
3) Missing Role Definition. 
The online world is novel not only for the individuals who must place 
their trust in it and the interactions mediated by it, but for the 
individuals, groups, and institutions who must prove themselves 
worthy of, or meriting trust. The novelty and difference is not something 
simply to be overcome, to be gotten over, for it is these differences 
and this novelty that is touted as the boon of the online world. 
Enthusiasts invite you to participate in it because it is new, different, 
better, seamless, immediate, unstuffy, truly democratic, and so forth. 
To the extent that the online world is sui generis in these ways, 
however, it undermines the powerful mechanism of traditional role 
definition. We do not yet have in its place the mutually understood 
systems that define and support roles. While some of the traditional 
roles appear to have shifted online (e.g. the shopkeeper) these, 
nevertheless are different in ways that may be unsettling. We are not 
certain whether our expectations of them are supported in precisely 
the same way as they are offline. Besides those that appear similar, 
there many new functions and new roles: online casinos, online 
communities, «sysops», avatars, bulletin board moderators, and so 
on, whose natures are not yet formulated and almost certainly not 
commonly recognized among all citizens of the online world. 
Securing Trust through Safety 
Under conditions where many of the usual cues of trust and 
trustworthiness are missing or obscured, how do we sustain trust 
online? The answer to this question that many people support 
promotes security and safety as the panacea. Supported by security 
experts, security-minded systems managers, government oversight 
bodies and espousers of e-commerce, this answer holds as its 
objective a perfected toolkit of security mechanisms as the key to 
ensuring safety for sanctioned participants of the online world. The 
toolkit would protect these participants against harm to them, their 
computers, and their information. 
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Concern over computer security is almost as old as computing itself. 
For decades pursuit of security technology has grown side by side the 
growth of computing and has expanded and changed shape in 
response to numerous changes in computing as well as its 
application. Conceiving of trust as one of the guiding principles of 
security technology, however, is a recent phenomenon. Considers 
some of the ways that security mechanisms function to remedy the 
loss of cues and clues that appears to be an inevitable condition of 
the online context: 1) Access Control; 2) Transparency of Identity; and 
3) Surveillance. 
1. Access Control (Insiders versus Outsiders) 
One of the earliest worries that security experts had to face even when 
computers served as stand-alone calculators and repositories of 
information was guarding access to and the integrity of systems and 
information. This meant keeping unauthorized agents out, while 
allowing authorized agents in. This need has persisted even as the 
technology has developed, especially in the wake of networking and 
greatly increased potential for interactivity among online agents. 
Interactivity means greater capacity of unsanctioned access and 
damage: viruses carried via emails, evil Websites, applets that cause 
harm; and information damaged or stolen while in transit. Security 
experts offer a suite of mechanisms to protect against unwanted 
access including passwords; «firewalls» (barriers around systems 
intended to make them impermeable to all but sanctioned access); 
and various applications of cryptography to protect the integrity and 
privacy of information held in computers and in transit across 
networks. 
2. Transparency of Identity 
Another means of securing systems and networks is through greater 
transparency of identity. To begin with, identification is a necessary 
complement to access control because controlling access because 
controlling access hardly ever means preventing anyone from using a 
system or information but involves, rather finding a way to distinguish, 
reliably and accurately, between authorized and unauthorized agents. 
Identification serves also to distinguish between those who are 
deserving of or have rights to certain online goods and services. It 
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increases the possibility of holding agents accountable, and for 
identifying perpetrators when harm is discovered. For these reasons, 
and others, transparency of identity is important. 
Proposed methods of attaining transparency of identity are numerous 
and vary according to needs. For the cases where a strong link is 
needed between a virtual agent and a physical person, security 
experts have, for example, pursued strategies for biometric 
identification (e.g. through fingerprints, DNA profiles, retinal images.) 
For purposes of authenticating persons, computers, or institutions as 
sources of action or information, cryptographic techniques offer an 
array of possibilities such as digital signatures and digital certificates. 
A further application of these mechanisms ensures non-repudiation by 
agents of commitments or promises they may have made. 
3. Surveillance 
Overlaid upon the security offered through access control and 
transparency of identity, there is a third layer, namely security through 
surveillance. Whether by actively watching or tracking actions and 
transactions, or by passively recording (reifying) digital trails, 
mechanisms of surveillance offer the prospect of preventing harms as 
well as apprehending perpetrators after harm has been done. 
Technically, surveillance may take the form of «intrusion detection» 
where a real-time monitoring system can issue an alarm in response 
to suspicious activity. It can also take the form of logging and auditing 
which creates records of activity that can be sifted through and 
studied at a later time. Logging and auditing helped authorities 
identify the alleged creator of the Melissa virus. 
Evaluating the Idea of Trust Through Security 
The claim on behalf of the science and engineering of security is that 
the closer we can get to perfecting a suite of mechanisms for 
controlling access to systems and information, for acquiring reliable 
markers of identity, and for maintaining a watchful eye, the closer we 
will get to a world worthy of trust. We will attain trust through security. 
This claim has prima facie plausibility because many of the 
mechanisms function precisely to restore many of the clues and cues 
lost to appraisal in the online world. This is most easily seen in the 
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mechanisms of identification provides information about the agents 
with whom people interact and thereby restores some of the cues and 
clues, including in some cases information about the past record of an 
agent. These mechanisms also allow for the creation of reliable online 
reputations. Assuring non-repudiation restores accountability, as does 
surveillance. 
Despite the promise, and despite the clear benefits security 
promises, I will argue as a means of engendering trust, security 
cannot provide the complete answer. The prevailing rhetoric that 
places full confidence in the attainment of trust through security is 
misguided not because security, appropriately used, is a misguided 
effort but because when the proponents of security and e-commerce 
would bind trust too closely to security they threaten to usurp a concept 
as rich and complex, as intensely social, cultural and moral, as trust, 
for merely one slim part of it. The mistake is not merely semantic; it 
has weighty practical consequences. Pursuing trust online by pursuing 
the complete fulfillment of the three goals of security would no more 
achieve trust and trustworthiness, online -- in their full blown senses -- 
than prison bars, surveillance cameras, airport X-ray conveyers, body 
frisks, and padlocks, could achieve offline. For the ends envisioned by 
the proponents of security and e-commerce are contrary to core 
meanings and mechanisms of trust. 
Interpreting trust as security is inadequate in at least two ways: one is 
that it could lead to a climate that is hostile, not friendly to trust. 
Interpreting trust as security will diminishes the «quality of life» in the 
online world by diminishing critical opportunities for forming and 
nourishing trust. The second problem with this interpretation is that, as 
currently conceived, pursuing trust through security contributes toward 
a status quo that misses some important requirements of trust online 
because it still leaves the door open to a broad range of trust-
undermining actions. In order to develop these ideas, we need to 
refer, once again, to theoretical insights. 
The Nature of Trust 
Trust is an attitude. It is almost always a relational attitude involving at 
least a trustor and a trustee. In the relation of trust, those who trust 
accept their vulnerability to those in whom they place trust. The realize 
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that those they trust may exercise their power to harm, disappoint, or 
betray; yet at the same time they regard those others «as if» they 
means well, or, at least, mean no harm. Trust, then, is a form of 
confidence in another, confidence that the other, despite a capacity to 
do harm, will do the right thing in relation to the trustor. The 
philosopher, Annette Baier characterizes trust as «accepted 
vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of 
good will) toward one» (235); trust is the «reliance on others’ 
competence and willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one 
cares about which are entrusted to their care.» (259) For Russell 
Hardin, it is quite simple, «…virtually all writers on trust agree, trust 
involves giving discretion to another to affect one’s interests.» (507) In 
a similar vein, Adam Seligman holds trust to be «some sort of belief in 
the goodwill of the other, given the opaqueness of other’s intentions 
and calculations.» (43) 
Whether trust is a species of belief (or expectation) or a non-cognitive 
attitude is a matter of some disagreement. Those who hold it to be a 
species of belief are more likely to subject it to judgments of rationality 
or irrationality. But, like Becker, even those theorists who hold it to be 
a non-cognitive attitude agree that it is systematically responsive to 
evidence as well as the variety of cues and clues discussed earlier. 
Although for purposes of this essay, we do not need to take a stand 
on the question of belief versus non-cognitive attitude, we draw (have 
drawn already) on both empirical and analytic work linking trust 
systematically with the presence or absence of various cues. 
Securing Trust versus Nourishing Trust 
Let us now turn to the first critique, namely, that that pursuit of trust 
through security may actually quash trust. How so? Common to all the 
works on trust that I studied was a recognition that trusting involves 
vulnerability. When people trust, they expose themselves risk. 
Although trust is not usually groundless, it involves no guarantees. The 
cues, clues, and triggers may give evidence of the reasonableness of 
trust but they do not, cannot, amount to certainty. (Pettit, Luhmann, 
Weinstock.) As Hardin writes, trust is «inherently subject to the risk 
that the other will abuse the power of discretion.» (507) Where people 
are guaranteed safety, where they are protected from harm via 
assurances, as when the other acted under coercion, for example, 
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trust is redundant, trust is not needed. What we have is certainty, 
security, safety – not trust. The evidence, the signs, the cues and clues 
that ground the formation of trust must always fall short of certainty; 
trust is an attitude without guarantees, without a complete warrant. 
When we constrain variables in ways that make things certain – safe -
- we are usurping trust’s function. Trust is squeezed out of the picture. 
No loss, some, like Richard Posner, would say: «But trust, rather than 
being something valued for itself and therefore missed where full 
information makes it unnecessary, is, I should think, merely an 
imperfect substitute for information.» (Posner, 408) According to this 
position, if we must choose between trust (and vulnerability) on the 
one hand, and certainty, on the other, then surely certainty wins. In the 
online world, however, the costs of certainty are considerable. 
In an environment as extensive, rich and complex as the online world, 
aiming for safety and certainty above all has a price – namely, 
limitation. We do not have the means at our disposal of assuring 
safety at the same time that we are able to benefit from the full 
richness, opportunity and complexity. The former would require 
simplification and constraint. It would mean curtailing the scope and 
nature of interaction; would a priori judgments about whom we will 
interact with and whom not. It would involve opening ourselves up to 
greater transparency and surveillance. The choice is not, at least yet, 
between a secure Cyberspace and an insecure, unsafe one. The cost 
of a perfectly secure Cyberspace is a limiting and constraining of what 
people can do online, the range and nature of activities allowed to 
them, the freedoms they can experience, and the complexity of 
relationships and community they can build. 
When scholars of trust say that trust involves vulnerability or risk, they 
can be understood as making more than conceptual claims about 
trust. They may, of course, be interested in saying something about 
the sense contained in the notion of trust, that whatever attitude a 
person has it cannot be trust if it involves no vulnerability, but they may 
also be offering conjectures on the empirical nature of trust, its 
conditions, its causes, and its effects. In this second mode, several 
scholars have suggested that in a context of complete certainty, the 
conditions needed to induce and nourish trust are absent. Trust will 
not flourish in a perfectly secure environment for reasons that are very 
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different from those that explain why trust will not flourish in a hostile, 
threatening environment. For trust to develop between an individual 
and either another individual or an organization, the individual must 
somehow have had the opportunity to test the other agent and have 
them pass the test. Luhmann, below, explains the crucial role of 
uncertainty in the process of building trust, 
First of all there has to be some cause for displaying trust. There has 
to be defined some situation in which the person trusting is dependent 
on his partner; otherwise the problem does not arise. His behaviour 
must then commit him to this situation and make him run the risk of his 
trust being betrayed. In other words he must invest in what we called 
earlier a «risky investment». (42) 
When we are placed in a context where we depend on others for our 
well-being and are assured or guaranteed that these others will not 
harm us, then the context is a safe and secure one, but not one that 
nourishes trust. No test has been given; none has been passed. The 
variables that theorists and empirical scientists have identified as 
trust-inducing, may signal the reasonableness of trust in a particular 
setting, but when grounds are transformed into guarantees of good 
behavior trust disappears replaced not by distrust but, perhaps, by 
certainty. In the presence of a violent psychopath whose limbs are 
shackled, one feels not trust, but – at best -- safety. 
There is yet another reason to question the efficacy of security in 
delivering trust. Boxing people in is a notoriously bad strategy for 
inducing trustworthiness or even trust-reliance. Constraining freedom 
directly, or indirectly through, say, surveillance may backfire and have 
the opposite effect. Roderick Kramer notes in his review of empirical 
work in the social sciences on the effects of close supervision or 
surveillance in the workplace on trust, 
Ironically, there is increasing evidence to suggest that such systems 
can actually undermine trust and may even elicit the very behaviors 
they are intended to suppress or eliminate. In a recent discussion of 
this evidence, Cialdini (1996) identified several reasons why 
monitoring and surveillance can diminish trust within an organization. 
First, there is evidence that when people think their behavior is under 
the control of extrinsic motivators, intrinsic motivation may be reduced 
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(Enzle & Anderson 1993). Thus, surveillance may undermine 
individuals’ motivation to engage in the very behaviors such 
monitoring is intended to induce or ensure. (16 of 19) 
Pettit reinforces this observation, 
…certain intrusive forms of regulation can be counter-productive and 
can reduce the level of performance in the very area they are 
supposed to affect. … If heavy regulation is capable of eradicating 
overtures of trust, and of driving out opportunities for trusting 
relationships, then it is capable of doing great harm. (225) 
The many inducements at the disposal of individuals and institutions 
to encourage trustworthiness are most effective when they operate 
indirectly. Above all people need to perceive a choice. By means of 
these inducements, including sanctions and rewards, clearly 
articulated norms, education, and character development, etc. we may 
increase the incidence of trust as well as trust-reliance, but if we go 
too far, and deny the possibility of choice, we deny what is 
fundamental to trusting relationships and climates of trust. 
Applying these observations to the online context, we would conclude 
that acceding to surveillance, strong identification, restriction on the 
range and variety of interaction to ones known to be «safe» and to 
emanate from reputable people and organizations, and so forth, may 
yield sufficient assurance and safety to please security conscious 
individuals. It would probably encourage greater participation in E-
commerce. At the same time it would limit the spectrum of possible 
experiences online. The tradeoff is clear: a more freewheeling, open, 
permissive online world is likely to be the less safe. Proponents of 
security would limit the range of interactivity, increase surveillance and 
transparency – all in the name of trust. I have tried to contrast the 
safety, assurance, and warranties that is security’s goal with the 
experimentation and risk that are the test-beds for trust. Through 
security we may create a safer world, inhospitable to trust not 
because there is distrust, but because trust cannot be nourished in 
environments where risk and vulnerability are, for practical purposes, 
eradicated. By trying, as it were, to enforce trust, we make its 
emergence impossible. 
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Security is no Panacea 
We turn now to the second critique of trust through security. It is this. 
Even if we were somehow to get past the misgivings discussed 
above, there remains a considerable question about the promise of 
security technology, as currently pursued, as the decisive remedy for 
the precariousness of trust. If the earlier criticism was that security 
overshoots the mark and creates an environment that does not allow 
trust to take root and flourish, then this criticism is that security may not 
go far enough. Even though security mechanisms promises to reduce 
our vulnerability in some ways, it leaves us vulnerable in other ways 
that are relevant to the prospects of trust online. This loophole is all the 
more worrisome because having achieved some modes of safety 
through security we might fail to notice its significance until 
considerable damage is done. 
To elaborate on this claim, let me set in place a simplification which 
we can discard in a little while. For purposes of many discussions of 
security, it is useful to frame what is at stake terms of «insiders» and 
«outsiders.» Experts in computer security respond to the worry that 
malicious (avaricious, incompetent) outsiders may break into our 
online space, compromise or steal information, and destroy or 
compromise our systems. They develop security mechanisms to keep 
the outsiders where they belong – outside, and to help spot, or identify 
outsiders as such, and in order to take appropriate action – 
preventative or punitive. 
Thus far, security mechanisms have not systematically recognized the 
threats of insiders, those agents (people, organizations, entities) who 
have traditionally been allowed, by degrees, legitimate access to our 
spaces. These agents, who count among the respectable, socially 
sanctioned, reputable members of online society, engage in actions 
that many citizens of the online world dislike, resent, consider harmful. 
They track our Web activities, they collect and use personal 
information without our permission, they plant «cookies» on our hard 
drives, they fill our mailboxes with spam, and they engage in relentless 
commercialism. Some of these insiders – perhaps not the 
«respectable» ones – afflict us with hateful emails («flame»), send us 
threatening chain mail, and even attack our virtual selves. (See 
Dibell’s «A Rape in Cyberspace.») In other words, even if the walls of 
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security keep outsiders outside, they do not curtail the harmful 
intrusions that, behind the veil of respectability and legal sanction, 
make online citizens skittish, cautious and resentful, intrusions that are 
fully capable of engendering a climate of suspicion and distrust online 
even if we are successful in our projects to secure the online world. 
A wall of defense against malicious outsiders does not defend 
against the threats posed by legitimate insiders. Respectable 
members of the online world who energetically defend their «right» to 
exercise online freedoms (by means of cookies, misleading 
registration, matching, mining, and so on) are, I argue, chipping away 
at trust just as surely as the allegedly amoral hackers. The former, as 
much as the latter, are capable of causing a dangerous ebb in the 
abundant social capital we currently enjoy in life online. The results of 
these small transgressions may not be immediately evident because 
it is in the nature of trust to be conservative – both to build and to ebb. 
(Slovic, Becker) 
That the transgressions I speak of are capable of undermining trust is 
implied by several of the works that have shaped this essay. Quite 
specifically, a long-term study of e-commerce strongly indicates that 
trust is related to consumers’ sense that information about them would 
be held in confidence by those with whom they transact. (Hoffman, 
Novak and Peralta). That is, suspicion is directed not only to foreign 
third-parties but even to familiar parties who deal in ways thought to 
be inappropriate with personal information. Other works on trust point 
to variables capable of undermining trust which would appear 
invulnerable to the familiar suite of security mechanisms. I note, in 
particular, work that highlights the way intentions and motivations of an 
agent may affect whether others perceive them to be trustworthy or 
trust-reliant. Although trust is related to the pattern of relevant past 
experiences in an obvious way -- positive experiences generally 
breeding trust, betrayals breeding distrust -- the intentions and 
motivations of the other party can affect the way these experiences 
are interpreted. Lawrence Becker convincingly discusses this point. 
Becker argues that intention, or will, matters even more in the 
formation of trust than outcome; it is in the goodwill of the other that we 
trust (or fail to trust). As long as we believe that others are well-
intentioned towards us, our trusting attitude towards them will survive a 
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great deal of bad news: «incompetence, mendacity, greed and so 
forth.» (51) Even in relation to government, Becker suggests that only 
when citizens begin to attribute the poor performance of governments 
to deviant motivations (e.g. corruption or inappropriate power 
seeking) will they «respond in ways that are … volatile and 
disruptive». Citizens’ trust, it seems, is able to survive incompetence, 
at least for a while. In a similar vein, Paul Slovic, an expert on risk 
assessment, reports that the extent to which citizens are willing to 
accept societal risk due to technological innovation is related to their 
degree of confidence in the motives of those in charge. 
Gaining knowledge of the motives and intentions of others often 
requires subtle detection and artfulness. Where direct information is 
not available – as usually is the case -- we infer them from a myriad of 
indirect sources. Among these indirect sources, the others’ interests 
feature significantly. When, for example, a politician seeking office 
expresses concern for a particular situation, voters may attribute the 
expression not to genuine feeling but to an interest in being elected. 
The public lives of all people are filled with the need to interact, even 
cooperate, with others whose interests are not consistent with their 
own and may even conflict. In such cases, we transact cautiously, ever 
on the lookout for betrayal, or as a collective, we seek protection from 
betrayals and exploitation. Learning progressively that individuals and 
corporations wishing to increase their potency benefit from 
information gathering and numbing commercialism, people will realize 
that such interests are not consistent with their own. If we choose not 
to pursue policies for the online world that contain the pursuit of 
avaricious interests that are contrary to those of the citizens of the Net, 
we are, I fear, planting the seeds of general distrust. People may 
continue to participate in this arena, but will do so with caution and a 
sense of wariness, wisely so, in interactions with those whose 
interests run contrary to our own and whose actions may be annoying, 
bothersome, intrusive, or even threatening. Guardedness will be the 
norm. 
Those who would pursue security in the name of trust do us this 
disservice. They focus on the outsider, the aberrant individual (or 
organization), the trickster, the evil hacker, the scam artist. These are 
the villains from which security would protect us. But these techniques 
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do nothing against the agent, acting behind the veil of respectability, 
who invades our privacy and offends us by turning Cyberspace to its 
own interests and not ours. For the lives of the vast majority of Net 
users, the second and not the first, is the significant danger; the 
second at least as much as the first, that affects our attitudes of trust 
online. 
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